Themes emerging from the collection of articles in the Special Section on Long-Term Spatial Memory include the notion of multiple spatial systems, the relation between spatial representations and episodic memory, the role of context, and the neural systems involved in space. The authors conclude that distinguishing between egocentric and allocentric spatial systems makes sense of both behavioral and neurobiological data. The special role of the hippocampal system in allocentric space, and as a consequence, in context, suggests how a spatial system might end up central to the ability to remember episodes.
For the past 30 years or so, the study of the neural systems concerned with spatial cognition has largely intersected with the study of the neural systems concerned with memory. It has become increasingly clear that some forms of spatial cognition are handled by the same brain systems implicated in episodic memory. Thus, a clearer understanding of the neural underpinnings of spatial cognition promises to illuminate both the spatial brain and memory itself. One interesting parallel, for example, might allow researchers to distinguish among forms of spatial cognition and then generalize that to forms of memory. This, in essence, is what O' Keefe and Nadel (1978) tried to do some years ago. The set of articles in this special section provided ample food for thought about these and other issues. Our comments focus on three major themes that emerged from these articles, in ways that we hope demonstrate some of the promise alluded to above. We start by briefly describing each of these themes, after which we look into them in greater detail, with special emphasis on the notion of multiple forms of spatial cognition.
Types of Space
These articles provided clear support for the proposition that there are multiple forms of spatial knowledge and that this knowledge can be used to support the various kinds of spatial strategies that animals and humans use to solve problems in the world. This point, central to O'Keefe and Nadel's (1978) cognitive map theory but so often overlooked in the literature, was made convincingly with behavioral data (Shelton & Gabrieli, 2004) , neuropsychological data (Bohbot, Iaria, & Petrides, 2004; Feigenbaum & Morris, 2004; King, Trinkler, Hartley, Vargha-Khadem, & Burgess, 2004) , and neuroimaging data (Bohbot et al., 2004; Parslow et al., 2004) . In addition, there was considerable agreement as to how the brain carves up its handling of spatial knowledge and spatial strategies. It is now clear that allocentric and egocentric spatial information is handled separately and that the hippocampal formation is particularly involved with allocentric but not egocentric space. The latter appears to be the province of at least the caudate nucleus.
The Role of Context
The idea that the hippocampal formation plays some kind of a role in dealing with context has been around for some time (Hirsh, 1974; Nadel & Willner, 1980) . More recently, this idea has gained support among those studying amnesia, and the involvement of the hippocampus in a variety of context effects in animal learning paradigms has also been reported (e.g., Good & Honey, 1991; Rudy, Barrientos, & O'Reilly, 2002) . Some researchers have recently suggested that this role in "context" might serve as the bridge that links spatial cognition to episodic memory. One of the key questions in any consideration of context is whether context is just one thing or if there are many kinds of context (just as there are many kinds of space and many kinds of memory). We have argued in the past that there are multiple contexts and that spatial and temporal contexts in particular exist independently (cf. Nadel & Willner, 1980; O'Keefe, Nadel, & Willner, 1979) . We have recently shown (Hayes, Ryan, Schnyer, & Nadel, 2004) in a functional MRI (fMRI) study that spatial context activates parahippocampal gyrus significantly more than does temporal context. Several of the articles (King et al., 2004; Mayes, Montaldi, Spencer, & Roberts, 2004) in this special section addressed various aspects of context and the possible special role played by spatial context.
Differentiation of Function Within the Medial Temporal Lobe
There has been a long debate about whether there are sharp functional boundaries among various parts of the medial temporal lobe (MTL). This is the sort of question that is more easily approached with neuroimaging data than with lesion data. Four articles in this section (Bohbot et al., 2004; Mayes et al., 2004; Parslow et al., 2004; Shelton & Gabrieli, 2004 ) provided a mixed message on this point. Bohbot et al. took a strong position, offering clearly distinct functions for the hippocampus and the parahippocampal region. Mayes et al. also proposed some differentiation of function within the MTL. We suspect that various spatial and memorial functions impose particular demands that translate into specific computational requirements and that this drives the functional differentiation one sees in the MTL. Put most simply, it takes a different set of computations to process allocentric maps than it does to process egocentric ones. Brain structures are set apart by this fact, with each structure processing a certain kind of information and organized in ways that are appropriate to the kind of information processed and the type of processing being carried out.
Types of Space: How Many and What Kinds
There seems to be general agreement about two fundamentally different kinds of spatial knowledge. Some researchers use the terms egocentric and allocentric; others use the terms viewpoint dependent and viewpoint independent, but they are talking largely about the same thing. In the former case, knowledge is represented in a format that reflects specific experience-how things appeared from a particular vantage point. In the latter case, that vantage point is gone, so in some sense it must be the case that allocentric representations necessarily integrate across multiple experiences.
We know from decades of work that there are spatial systems throughout the brain that exclusively process egocentrically coded spatial information. In vision and touch, for example, inputs are parallel processed in a number of distinguishable systems, each one of which keeps track of where things are in egocentric space. Much of the same is true of the motor system. None of this is surprising, of course, as the need to accurately represent and respond to objects in egocentric space is paramount for most animals. It is also not surprising that the more primitive collicular system integrates sensory and motor processing directly, within a system that links both inputs and outputs to where they happen in space in relation to the organism. Discussion of allocentric representation is a more recent phenomenon. Tolman (1948) deserves the credit for first talking about the possibility that animals form cognitive maps of environments they explore.
The dichotomy of allocentric versus egocentric, or viewpoint independent versus viewpoint dependent, is fundamental to the majority of questions pursued in the articles in this special section. This prominence accurately reflects this distinction's fundamental role in theories on space and spatial behavior. In O'Keefe and Nadel's (1978) cognitive map theory, the existence of these two separate and distinct spatial systems held a central place. What is worth pointing out is that an organism equipped with these two different classes of solutions to spatial problems has a choice: In other words, the organism must solve the problem of which system to activate in a given situation, because many spatial challenges can be solved either way (cf. Shelton & Gabrieli, 2004) . It is unclear how organisms make this decision, but there is empirical evidence (Bohbot et al., 2004 ) that these kinds of choices are actually made and that in the same situation, provided with the same information, different individuals make different decisions and sometimes even reverse their decisions after successful implementation and application of the initially chosen strategy. For example, Bohbot et al. (2004) reported that approximately half of their human participants spontaneously chose an allocentric strategy to solve their computerized radial arm maze, whereas the other half of the participants used an egocentric approach, although the experimental conditions were identical for all participants. In addition, some participants switched strategies later in the experiment. This latter finding parallels a recent observation concerning the navigational behavior of homing pigeons. On their first homing trip, they predominantly used a magnetic compass to calculate a heading vector home. After repeated trips, however, the birds shifted to a strategy that relied mainly on the British highway system. For example, they took exits and flew around traffic circles, although these routes were less efficient in terms of the distance traveled than the routes resulting from the initial method of navigation. Such cue-based piloting is more reliable than calculating and following a heading vector, so the navigational benefits outweigh the higher energetic costs.
This apparently unpredictable behavior of individuals is rarely controlled or assessed in experiments on spatial navigation, so the results of many studies cannot be definitively attributed to the recruitment of a specific class of spatial behavior. This is particularly problematic when the purpose of the study is to test a theoretical account of spatial behavior. For example, in recent discussions of the learning mechanisms that govern acquisition of cognitive maps, proponents of associative learning claim to have produced empirical evidence that stimulus-response learning, not the one-trial learning mechanism proposed by O' Keefe and Nadel (1978) , controls the creation of cognitive maps. However, the experimental protocols did not enforce use of specific spatial strategies and also failed to include an independent test of the nature of the spatial representation that the participants acquired in the test environment (cf. Hamilton & Sutherland, 1999) . In other words, in these studies it is entirely unclear whether an allocentric or egocentric representation of space provided the basis for spatial navigation. The point is that only behavior resulting from the use of allocentric representations-cognitive maps-can speak directly to this theory.
When a study's purpose is to assess a theory or a part thereof, unverified strategy use can promote confusion rather than clarification. If participants' spatial performance in an experimental paradigm can be based on either of two principle classes of spatial strategies, an increase in variance will likely be a consequence of not knowing which strategy was used. This may reduce the power to detect effects, because the measurement is contaminated, or diluted, by a mixture of spatial strategies. Research that addresses the environmental and organismic factors that determine spatial strategy use would be quite helpful at this point.
Because many of the articles in this special section verified the independent status of allocentric and egocentric spatial strategies and their separate neural underpinnings, it becomes critical to carefully control the strategies that participants are using. Unfortunately, this has rarely been done, and one can hope that the strong evidence provided by this set of articles will reinforce the importance of taking strategy use and variation into account.
The Role of Context
In 1974, Richard Hirsh suggested that the hippocampus somehow mediated the effects that context had on learning and memory. For Hirsh, the hippocampal role cut across all forms of context. Kinsbourne and Wood (1975) built on the distinction proposed a few years earlier by Tulving (1972) and suggested that patients with amnesia suffered from a failure of context-bound episodic memory. This notion was adopted by O' Keefe and Nadel (1978) in their treatment of the literature on human amnesia. Their position, however, differed from Hirsh in a critical way: Whereas Hirsh asserted that the hippocampal role cut across all forms of context, O'Keefe and Nadel largely restricted it to spatial context, leaving the issue of temporal context unresolved. Their position was extended in a series of articles over the next few years (Nadel & Willner, 1980; Nadel, Willner, & Kurz, 1985; O'Keefe et al., 1979) , in which the particularly spatial nature of this context role was amplified.
The debate has not been settled. The issue of whether there is something special linking spatial context and the hippocampus is parallel to the issue of whether the hippocampus is important for all kinds of relational learning or plays some special role in spatial relations. Thus, an answer to the question at the level of context might help decide the issue for memory in general. What did the current collection of articles tell us about the hippocampal role in context?
The data suggest that the hippocampal system is essential for spatial context but not for nonspatial context. King et al. (2004) tested Jon, who has developmental amnesia, on a context-dependent memory test. Jon had impaired memory for the context of an event (where he received the object or from whom he received it) and spared performance at recognizing the content of the event (i.e., which object was familiar). King et al. concluded the following:
Overall, our studies indicate a surprisingly close relationship between the mechanisms of episodic and spatial memory, in which the hippocampus appears to play a key role. This role seems to hinge on the requirement to store context-rich memories in a form that permits both the identification of a familiar place from a novel viewpoint and the reconstruction of a viewpoint-specific, quasi-perceptual experience of past events. (p. 415) Mayes et al. (2004) used fMRI to explore some of these same issues. Their results show two things: First, the hippocampal complex and the parahippocampal gyrus are differentially activated by spatial information processing, be it in learning or recall. Second, no fundamental distinction can be drawn between what they called episodic spatial information and semantic spatial information. The MTL was more active in either case when spatial content was involved. We have recently collected data showing that the parahippocampal gyrus is selectively activated during a recognition test that is dependent on spatial context but not on temporal context or objects (Hayes et al., 2004) . Others have noted that activity in the hippocampus and parahippocampal regions during encoding predicts subsequent recollections of context but not of items or objects alone (e.g., Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003) .
Although the data on this point are not definitive yet, the articles in this special section strengthen the position that spatial context is a special case, that it merits its own brain system (the hippocampal complex), and that by virtue of this role, it is a central player in both spatial navigation and episodic memory.
Differentiation of Function Within the MTL
Notwithstanding general agreement that the MTL plays a critical role in memory, there has been a longstanding debate about whether there is any differentiation of function within its various parts. One clear distinction has been drawn between episodic and semantic memory, with many researchers suggesting that parts of the MTL are critical for episodic memory, whereas other parts are critical for semantic memory. In the domain of spatial cognition, the question, as we have already seen, concerns mechanisms responsible for allocentric and egocentric memory, and here the data seem quite clear. Several articles in this special section showed that these two forms of spatial cognition are subserved by distinct neural systems. Parslow et al. (2004) used a virtual reality environment, with tasks involving both viewpoint-dependent (egocentric) and viewpoint-independent (allocentric) strategies. They found differential activation in the hippocampus and parahippocampal region for the allocentric task but not for the egocentric task. This result converges with the data from Feigenbaum and Morris (2004) , who used the same tasks with temporal lobectomy patients and demonstrated that damage in the MTL impaired allocentric but not egocentric tasks. Converging evidence was also reported by Bohbot et al. (2004) , who showed that egocentric spatial processing correlates with caudate nucleus activity, whereas allocentric processing engages the hippocampus.
Currently, there is considerable interest in the question of whether differences in function are sharp or graded. That is, how sharp are the functional boundaries among brain areas that are presumed to be cleanly demarcated anatomically? There are two ideas about this: First, the functional boundaries might be quite sharp, so that areas such as the parahippocampal gyrus and hippocampus proper play distinct roles. This could be approached experimentally in several ways. In single-neuron recording studies, cells with distinct properties might be observed when one moves from one brain area to another. At the conceptual level, there would be equally sharp distinctions, with each area representing a specific kind of information and carrying out a particular computation.
Second, differences of physiology and function could shade gracefully into one another, even across structural boundaries. In this view, for example, there is no sharp distinction between the functions of hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex, merely a gradual shift in the proportion of elements doing one thing or the other. The articles in this special section do not allow us to definitively answer this more complicated question, although they strongly support the view that the MTL is not homogeneous with respect to either spatial function or memory function. Bohbot et al. (2004) speculated that there are sharp differences between the parahippocampal region and the hippocampus itself. In their view, the parahippocampal area processes spatial scenes, which it passes onto the hippocampus for construction of viewpoint-independent cognitive maps. As noted already, Bohbot et al. found that egocentric spatial strategies, such as route following, engage an entirely separate system in the caudate, a result that has also been reported by Hartley, Maguire, Spiers, and Burgess (2003) .
We conclude that there are separate neural systems underlying the various kinds of spatial cognition and that even within these systems, the overall function (e.g., allocentric spatial cognition) seems likely to be split into several subfunctions, each of which is carried out by a different structure. It remains to be seen if the way in which spatial cognition is subdivided within the MTL maps onto the way in which memory functions are carved up in these areas.
Conclusion
This set of articles and other recent work significantly advance our understanding of spatial cognition as a domain and how this domain is subserved in the human brain. A number of conclusions seem warranted overall. First, there are many kinds of space, and these different types have their own distinct properties and under-lying neural substrates. Second, a major distinction exists between spatial representations linked to the observer (egocentric; viewpoint dependent) and those that are not linked (allocentric; viewpoint independent). Third, the hippocampal complex is critical for allocentric spatial learning and recall, whereas other brain systems such as the caudate play roles in egocentric space. Fourth, there is differentiation of function within the hippocampal region in the carrying out of this allocentric function. Fifth, the hippocampal role in spatial cognition seems to involve the representation of spatial contexts, and in this guise, one might hope to understand why this brain system is so central to episodic memory.
